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How important are intermediate tariffs in determining trade patterns? Empirical work 
measuring the impact of tariff liberalization most commonly focuses on the effects of 
barriers imposed by importers, but exporter trade policy should also matter when exports are 
produced with imported intermediates. Guided by extensions of the Eaton and Kortum 
(2002) model, I study the impact of trade liberalizations on U.S. bilateral trade from 1989-
2001. I estimate the impact on U.S. bilateral trade flows of both intermediate tariffs imposed 
by countries exporting to the United States and U.S. tariffs. My empirical estimates suggest 
that, especially for less developed countries, their own liberalizations have been 
quantitatively much more important in explaining changes in bilateral trade patterns, on 
average 4.2 times larger than the impact of US liberalizations. For the entire sample of 
countries, countries’ own liberalizations have been 2.2 times more important. 
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1. Introduction 
  In this paper I examine whether a country’s own trade policy is an important 
source  of comparative advantage. The  channel I consider  builds on the insight that 
countries which are not competitive at producing intermediate goods themselves may still 
be able to competitively produce more advanced stages of a good when able to acquire 
imported intermediate goods cheaply. In other words, when trade is vertically specialized, 
meaning that exported goods are made with imported intermediates as first defined by 
Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998), more liberal trade policy results in cheaper imported 
intermediates and a more likely comparative advantage. 
  I test this hypothesis by studying the pattern of U.S. trade between 1989 and 
2001. One striking feature of the data is that during this period, almost half of the 
increase in real U.S. manufacturing imports came from less developed countries, and the 
growth rates of their exports are substantially larger than those of developed countries.
1
                                                 
1 Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Import Price Indexes to calculate real U.S. imports, those countries 
with 1989 Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 dollars) less than 10,000 dollars accounted for 49 percent of 
the net change in real U.S. imports between 1989 and 2001. China’s and Mexico’s shares of the net change 
in real trade were each around 17 percent.  
 
While tariffs are generally thought to play a key role in explaining trade growth, U.S. 
tariff policy alone cannot explain either the changing distribution of import shares among 
countries, or the magnified growth of less developed country trade. Yet under vertical 
specialization, tariff policies of exporting  countries have a significant impact on 
specialization patterns by increasing or decreasing the costs of foreign intermediates.   2 
Notwithstanding the documented growth of this type of trade, further evidence of vertical 
specialization as a possible contender in explaining these trade patterns is implied by the 
very suggestive way trade policy has evolved across countries over the period 1989 to 
2001.
2
  Identifying why less developed country export growth has outpaced developed 
country export growth may be incorporated into the broader question of what explains 
trade growth. Economists have long seen increases in real trade as being the consequence 
of multilateral and bilateral trade liberalizations and to technology led declines in 
transportation costs. Monopolistic Competition or ‘New Trade Theory’ models, such as 
Helpman (1987) and Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), can explain trade growth among 
developed countries through income convergence.
 The least developed countries, which experienced the greatest growth rates in 
exports to the U.S., also experienced the greatest degree of trade liberalization. 
3
                                                 
2 Several empirical studies have documented the growing importance of vertical production networks and 
their contribution to trade growth. Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi (1998) show that vertical specialization, as 
measured by the value of imported intermediates in exports, or foreign value added in exports, has 
accounted for a large and increasing share of international trade over the last several decades. Using input-
output tables for 10 OECD countries and four emerging markets, Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) calculate 
that vertical specialization accounts for 21 percent of these countries’ exports and grew almost 30 percent 
between 1970 and 1990. They also show that vertical specialization accounts for 30 percent of the growth 
in these countries’ exports. In related work, Feenstra (1998) compares several different measures of the 
international fragmentation of production, and argues that all have increased since the 1970’s. 
 In recent years, empirical research 
3 Debaere (2003) shows that the increasing similarity in GDP among OECD country pairs leads to higher 
bilateral trade to GDP ratios, suggesting some support for Helpman (1987), whose model explains intra-
industry trade that is prevalent among developed countries. However, he also shows that Helpman's   3 
has focused on the changing ranges of goods that countries export, and have observed 
non-negligible increases in this range among countries undergoing trade liberalizations. 
This finding has led some to conjecture that trade in new goods is behind the magnified 
growth in world trade.
4
                                                                                                                                                 
prediction is rejected for non-OECD countries, among which intra-industry trade is not critical. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2001) estimate a gravity equation of bilateral trade derived from a standard trade model. They 
find that average bilateral tariff rate reductions account for about 25 percent of trade growth in their sample 
of several OECD countries, but little evidence of income convergence playing a role in explaining trade 
growth. 
  Finally,  increases in outsourcing and vertical production 
networks have likewise been put forth as an explanation. Yi (2003) was one of the first to 
argue that vertical specialization was what was needed to solve the quantitative puzzle of 
why aggregate trade responds so strongly to moderate tariff reductions. As Yi (2003) 
4 Ruhl (2005) shows how permanent tariff reductions, as opposed to temporary business cycle shocks, 
affect firms’ decisions to export such that the failure to account for these new goods produces large 
aggregate elasticities of exports to tariffs. Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) study trade liberalizations for 18 
countries and show how substantial increases in the extensive margin coincided with trade liberalizations. 
However, recent research has undermined the claim that the extensive margin is behind the magnified 
response of trade to tariffs. Debaere and Mostashari (2010) investigate the link between the extent of tariff 
reductions and the changing extensive margin using disaggregate trade and tariff data for the United States. 
They find that U.S. tariffs and tariff preferences are statistically significant, but their overall contribution to 
the extensive margin is small. These findings of a limited response to tariffs specifically along the extensive 
margin of trade can also be linked to recent plant-level studies. Bernard and Jensen (2004a,b) and Das, 
Roberts and Tybout (2007) find that there are large fixed costs for firms that begin to export. These fixed 
costs rationalize why moderate tariff reductions primarily induce an increase in exports at the intensive 
rather than the extensive margin.   4 
points out, in order to explain actual trade increases standard trade models require trade 
to tariff elasticities much higher than those typically estimated or employed in 
simulations and calibrations.
5
  Yi’s (2003) two-country analysis focuses on the developed world: the United 
States and the rest of the developed world. This paper exploits the variation in tariff 
policy across countries. In evaluating the response of U.S. imports relative to output by 
country to U.S. tariff liberalizations, one finds that the countries with the largest increases 
in exports to the United States relative to U.S. trade liberalizations correspond to those 
country groups which underwent substantial liberalizations in their own tariff regimes. 
This finding is a direct consequence of the greater export growth rates of low income 
countries and the fact that the evolution of U.S. tariff policy did not differ systematically 
 By simulating global tariff reductions, he shows that his 
two-country model of vertical specialization can generate a nonlinear response of trade to 
tariff reductions and can explain over 50 percent of the growth of world trade over his 
sample period without assuming counterfactually large elasticities.  
                                                 
5 For example, Yi measures developed world tariff decreases for manufactured goods between 1962 and 
1999 to be around 11 percentage points, and indicates that if tariff reductions are to explain the observed 
growth in trade’s share of output, standard trade models require elasticities of substitution in the order of 
12-15. Anderson et al. (2005), argue that only an elasticity of 17 can match world bilateral trade patterns, 
and Feinberg and Keane (2009) need an elasticity in the range of 25 to 30 to explain the increase of intra-
firm trade as a fraction of total sales for Canadian Multinationals between 1983 and 1996. However, actual 
estimates of these elasticities are much smaller. For example, Broda and Weinstein’s (2006) median 
estimate of the elasticity of substitution is in the order of 3.1; Romalis’s (2007) demand elasticities range 
between 6.2 and 10.9.    5 
across developed and less developed country lines.
6
   In order to empirically investigate whether trade and tariff policy patterns are 
related under the auspices of vertical specialization, an economic model which recognizes 
intermediate trade is required. Eaton and Kortum (2002) develop a multi-country and 
multi-good  Ricardian model that captures the competing forces of productivity 
differences and geographic barriers in determining trade flows. Furthermore, their model 
explicitly allows for access to intermediate goods to contribute to specialization patterns. 
This paper extends their model to the industry level and looks at trade volumes over the 
period 1989-2001  to exploit the variation in bilateral trade  and trade  policy across 
countries, industries, and time. I show that a simple modification of one of Eaton and 
Kortum’s (2002) key equations produces a measure of bilateral trade that is directly 
dependent on both importing country tariffs and exporting country tariffs.  Importantly, 
this paper makes a first attempt to present an empirical trade model which satisfies 
several criteria; the model first incorporates the possibility of vertically specialized trade, 
second is general in its ability to be applied to many specialization patterns, third allows 
 Hence, the same anomaly which 
motivates Yi’s (2003) analysis is present here, but more pronounced for those countries 
which underwent a large degree of trade liberalization themselves over the sample period.   
                                                 
6 U.S. tariffs did decrease more for NAFTA countries and also for countries which gained eligibility for 
GSP status over the sample period. However, for most other countries U.S. tariff decreases were in the 
order of 2 percentage points on average.    6 
one to quantify the response of trade to both final and intermediate tariff liberalizations, 
and fourth is derived directly from theory.
7
  Consistent with what the stylized facts suggest, the estimation results suggest that 
exporting country tariffs are statistically significant and that their liberalizations have 
been, on average, relatively more important in increasing bilateral integration with the 
United States  than U.S. liberalizations. The liberalizations of the least developed 
countries in the sample, those countries with 1989 Real GDP per capita (constant 2005 
dollars) less than 3000  dollars, have on average been 4.2  times more important in 
explaining changes in bilateral trade patterns than U.S. tariff liberalizations. 
 
   Though there is  a growing body of research documenting the importance  of 
international production networks, little is known about the cause of this type of 
production and the contribution of tariff policy.
8
                                                 
7 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have been especially critical of the misleading and biased results of 
gravity model estimations not founded in theory.  
 Certainly there is a sizeable literature, 
both empirical and computational, quantifying the response of trade to tariff 
liberalizations and changes in production costs in general, but little attention has been 
8 A large literature on outsourcing’s role on rising wage inequality in advanced nation has emerged in 
response to these changing trade patterns. See, for example, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) and Markusen 
and Venables (1995, 1996a,b) who show how outsourcing can augment the wage skill gap in both 
locations. Krugman and Venables (1995) find that lowering transport costs can lead to a fall in wage 
inequality across regions. More recently, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) decompose the effects of outsourcing 
and skill-biased technological change on wages for the United States between 1972 and 1990. Hsieh and 
Woo (2003) look at the impact of outsourcing to China on Hong-Kong’s Labor Market.    7 
given to quantifying the impact of intermediate tariff liberalization to export growth.
9
                                                 
9 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been used extensively to simulate the economic 
effects of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalizations. See Deardorff and Stern (1990), Brown, Deardorff 
and Stern (1995), Kehoe and Kehoe (1995), and Whalley (1985). For a survey of the literature on PTA’s, 
see Baldwin and Venables (1995). Romalis (2007) and Clausing (2001) look specifically at the effects of 
NAFTA and CUSFTA using disaggregate trade and tariff data. In an aggregate study, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2001) estimate a gravity equation of bilateral trade derived from a standard trade model. More recently Yi 
(2010) extended the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to explain how vertical specialization can help 
explain the home bias in trade.  
  A 
few papers which are similar in spirit to the analysis performed here and which find 
consistent results are Feinberg and Keane (2001), Swenson (2004), and Feenstra and Kee 
(2007). Feinberg and Keane (2001) examine how bilateral trade flows of U.S. 
multinational corporations and their Canadian affiliates responded to U.S. and Canadian 
tariff reductions. They find that Canadian affiliate sales to the United States  are 
negatively correlated with Canadian tariffs. Swenson (2004) examines how outsourcing 
decisions are affected by changes in country and competitor production costs, by looking 
exclusively at offshore assembly program (OAP) exports to the US, and likewise allows 
for intermediate trade costs to influence production costs. Swenson (2004) finds that 
when a country’s costs rise or competitors’ costs fall, the share of U.S. OAP activities in 
that location decline. Feenstra and Kee (2007) measure the response of an index of export 
variety (of Mexico’s exports to the US) to U.S. tariffs under NAFTA as well as Mexcio’s 
tariffs under NAFTA. They find that both have a statistically significant negative 
influence on Mexico’s export variety.   8 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides summary 
statistics of tariff and trade patterns for the United States and other countries during the 
sample period. Section 3 presents the main theory regarding the role of intermediate and 
final goods tariffs and other cost variables in explaining trade patterns. Sections 4 and 5 
contain the empirical strategy and results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate and quantify the importance of tariff 
policy under vertical specialization. In this context, tariff reductions can affect trade 
patterns on two fronts. First, countries which allow freer trade for intermediates and 
capital goods can decrease the cost of domestic production of final goods that make use 
of foreign intermediates. Clearly, the impact of a country’s own tariff policy will be 
particularly relevant to export penetration under vertical specialization. That is, if goods 
were not produced with imported intermediates either before or after a decrease on tariffs, 
then the impact of tariff liberalizations on export growth should be less significant.
10
                                                 
10 In addition to vertical specialization, trade policy of exporting countries may influence specialization 
patterns through other means. For example, several researchers have argued the importance of trade in 
general and particularly of capital goods or other intermediates which have a higher content of technology 
as a source of technology diffusion. See, for example, Xu and Wang (1999) and references therein.  Coe 
and Helpman (1995) relate productivity to the import-share weighted R&D of the countries’ trade partners, 
and find a positive regression coefficient.  
 
Second, as is the case even when trade is not vertically specialized, preferential tariffs can   9 
divert trade away from possibly more efficient sources if rates are sufficiently lower for 
preferentially treated countries. 
  The objective of this section is to characterize the main stylized facts of U.S. 
imports, U.S. tariffs and world tariff trends between 1989 and 2001.  To do so, I first 
investigate whether or not U.S.  imports as a share of output have grown by a large 
amount relative to U.S. tariff liberalization. Indeed, if one looks at the growth of trade to 
output relative to decreases  in  U.S.  tariffs, there is a great deal of variation across 
countries. In fact, less developed countries are accounting for an ever increasing share of 
U.S. trade, and constitute a non-trivial source of U.S. import growth. Historically, these 
countries have been the most protected, and consequently are the countries with room for 
the most substantial liberalizations.  Upon examination, those countries which 
experienced the greatest growth rates in exports to the United States also underwent the 
most pronounced liberalizations. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that 
increased access to foreign intermediate goods by way of a country’s own trade 
liberalization is an important determinant of export growth. 
   
2.1 Sources of U.S. import growth 
  Data on U.S. bilateral trade flows for manufacturing goods and tariff data (except 
for the United States) are taken from the World Bank’s Trade and Production Database, 
1976-2004.
11
                                                 
11 The sample is limited to 2001 since necessary U.S. data do not go beyond this year. 
  GDP data are taken from the Penn World Tables V.6.3.  U.S. tariff data are 
taken from the United States Trade Commission’s Tariff Database.    10 
  In the descriptive statistics that follow, the paper first looks at the change in U.S. 
manufacturing imports relative to U.S. output over the sample period. For this, imports 
are limited to those coming from a consistent panel of countries. In other words, all 
countries that were restructured (e.g. USSR) or for which the United States had a trade 
embargo in any year during the sample period are eliminated.
12
  I first investigate  whether or not U.S.  imports exhibit the same quantitative 
anomaly characteristic of the post WWII world economy, by looking at the changes in 
U.S. manufacturing imports relative to U.S. output between 1989 and 2001.
  Since trade patterns will 
be linked to bilateral trade policies, the set of countries is further limited only to countries 
for which these data are available. The countries included in the trade statistics are listed 
in Table 1.  
13
                                                 
12  There is one exception. For Germany, trade data are summed for East and West Germany before 
unification.  
  Table 2 
shows the evolution of the total U.S. imports relative to U.S. output and U.S. average 
manufacturing tariffs for the sample. The change in the natural log of the import share of 
output was approximately 58 percent, from .148 in 1989 to .265 in 2001. However, 
import weighted U.S. manufacturing tariffs decreased from 5.2 to 3.4 percent, which 
constitutes a decrease  in  the natural log of  gross tariffs of approximately 2 percent. 
Generating this increase in trade from U.S. tariff reduction alone requires an elasticity of 
13 The focus of imports relative to output as a measure of trade growth is primarily because this is the 
measure for which Yi (2003) derives his magnified and non-linear effects for world tariff liberalization.    11 
the import share of output to gross tariffs of around -33.75 which is large relative to those 
typically found in CGE models and those found in the empirical literature.
14
  However, the growth rates in U.S. imports of different countries have been quite 
varied. There has been a steady increase in the share of U.S. imports from the least 
developed countries in the sample, while the  share of U.S. imports from the  richest 
countries experienced a steady decrease. In 1989, the countries with less than 10,000 
dollars in real GDP per capita (measured in constant PPP 2005 dollars) accounted for 
approximately 11.6 percent of U.S. imports; however, by 2001, their share had doubled to 
23.2 percent.  In contrast, high income countries, those with more than 18,000 dollars in 
real GDP per capita (measured in constant PPP 2005 dollars) experienced a 15.3 
percentage point decrease in their import shares.  
  
  If one compares changes in imports relative to U.S. output for particular countries 
and country groups to U.S.  tariffs for these groups, one again finds a great deal of 
variation across countries. Table 3 summarizes the changes of the natural logs of imports 
relative to U.S. output, U.S. tariffs and the resulting implied trade to tariff elasticities for 
Canada, Mexico, China, and the rest of the world divided by development level between 
1989 and 2001. The elasticities are highest for China and other low income countries. 
While Canada experienced a pronounced increase in trade, of 49 percent, it also enjoyed 
                                                 
14 Elasticities found in the CGE literature are typically in the order of -2 to -3.5. See Deardorff and Stern 
(1990) and Whalley (1985). In a gravity model of bilateral trade, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) estimate an 
elasticity of -6.43. Eaton and Kortum’s (2002) estimated elasticity of their geographic barriers ranges from 
-2.4 to -12.86 depending on the specification.   12 
the largest decrease in average U.S. tariffs, around 4.1 percentage points. Consequently, 
the elasticity is only -11.84. Mexico’s elasticity, on the other hand, is a high -54.02.   
Imports from China relative to U.S. output, grew by 212 percent. Therefore, China’s 
implied trade to tariff elasticity is extraordinarily high at almost -266.64. However, even 
if one excludes China and Mexico, one finds that the least developed countries still have 
the largest growth rates producing elasticities of -133.68 and -138.9 for the two lowest 
income groups. For the high income countries, excluding Canada, the elasticity is -32.8. 
The substantial variation in the implied responses of trade to tariff reduction suggests that 
factors other than U.S. tariffs are contributing to the increased penetration of developing 
country trade. Furthermore, because U.S. tariffs did not decrease very much over this 
time period, on average around 2 percent, elasticities needed for U.S. tariff policy alone 
to generate these responses of trade are too large relative to what traditional models 
would suggest.   
   
2.2 Trade liberalizations across countries 1989-2001 
  To link these findings to the implications of tariff policy under vertical 
specialization, trends in tariff rates across all sampled countries are considered. Table 4 
summarizes average annual tariffs across countries and country groups. The particular 
measure of tariffs used  for all countries except Mexico and Canada is  the  import 
weighted  MFN tariff averaged across countries and ISIC 3-digit  manufacturing 
industries.  For Mexico and Canada, the tariff reported is the average manufacturing tariff 
imposed on U.S.  products taking into consideration the Canada U.S. Free Trade   13 
Agreement (CUSFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA). The 
largest decrease comes from the least developed countries with a change in the natural 
log of gross average tariffs of 39 percent (from an average tariff of 76 percent in 1989 to 
19 percent in 2001). Lower middle income countries experienced a decrease in the 
natural log of their gross tariff rates by 15 percent, while the decrease for upper middle 
income countries and high income countries was only 5 and 3 percent respectively. Tariff 
data for China is unavailable for the earlier years, but still between 1992 and 2001 the 
natural log of gross tariffs decreased by 22 percent.  On average Canadian tariffs on U.S. 
goods  decreased by  nearly  7  percentage points while Mexican tariffs  on U.S. goods 
decreased by 8.2 percent between 1991 and 1999.  
  With the exception of the NAFTA countries, U.S. tariffs decreased moderately, 
with no systematic difference in the decrease for developed and developing countries.
15
                                                 
15 Exceptions are some former Eastern European States which acquired eligibility for the U.S. Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) tariff rates after losing their communist status. For these low income 
countries, one sees a larger decrease in U.S. tariff rates over the time period.  See U.S. GSP Guidebook 
(1999) for the mandatory rules for eligibility. However, these outlier countries are not included in the 
sample. 
 
Moreover, the changes in these countries’ trade shares are hard to explain by U.S. tariff 
policy alone. Importantly, the least developed countries which were also the countries 
with the largest tariff decreases, had the greatest increases in U.S. import shares. While 
there are many reasons why less developed nations might be gaining relative to 
developed nations, these findings are at least consistent with the hypothesis that access to 
intermediates that must be imported may be an important component in explaining   14 
specialization patterns. If less developed countries are particularly disadvantaged at 
producing specialized intermediates, then tariff policy for these countries may be a 
critical determinant in expanding their exports. 
   
3. Theoretical Model  
  The statistics above suggest that tariff policy of exporting countries may have 
important consequences for the determination of specialization patterns and also help 
explain why the least developed countries in 1989 have experienced greater growth rates 
in U.S.  trade shares. In order to investigate this hypothesis, the paper  extends and 
modifies  the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to formulate an empirical model that 
relates bilateral trade flows to both importing and exporting country tariffs.  
  Employing a probabilistic model of technological heterogeneity, Eaton and 
Kortum (2002) derive simple structural equations linking bilateral trade to parameters 
related to absolute advantage, comparative advantage and geographic barriers in a multi-
country setting. Furthermore, their model explicitly incorporates a role for intermediate 
trade in the determination of specialization patterns. The Eaton and Kortum (2002) set-up 
is at the country level, yet both tariffs and intermediate intensity vary at more 
disaggregate levels. Therefore, the analysis first proposes a methodology which maintains 
the main structure of their theory, but which suggests an estimation that is at the industry   15 
level, and that therefore allows one to  exploit the variation in the data at this less 
aggregate level.
16
  Several important results for the derived empirical model are highlighted. First, 
the structural model developed here suggests a specific way of measuring bilateral trade 
when one wants to relate trade to bilateral tariffs when there is trade in intermediate 
goods and in a multi-country setting. Second, the particular measure of trade derived 
depends only on trade frictions between the two countries trading, and is independent of 
trade policies with other countries. Third, a simple manipulation of the trade flow term 
shows that the measure of vertical specialization first formulated by Hummels, Rapoport, 
and Yi (1998) and Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001), the value of imported intermediates in 
exports, is nested within the trade flow term as an extreme case.     
  
 
3.1 Technology and Preferences 
  There are K sectors. J and K will be used to denote sectors and any parameter or 
variable that is sector specific. Goods belonging to a particular sector are indicated with 
lower cases, such that a good belonging to sector K is denoted k and a good belonging to 
sector J is denoted j, where within each sector there are a continuum of goods ] 1 , 0 [ , ∈ k j . 
There are N countries, and i, n, and s will be used to indicate different countries. 
                                                 
16 Several studies have sought to extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to the sector level. For 
example, see Chor (2009) and Donaldson (2008); however, these papers do not also include intermediate 
trade. Yi (2010) extends the model to include three stages of production, but maintains the aggregate 
specification.    16 
  Consistent with Ricardian models, countries have access to the same technology 
but vary in their efficiency levels. This is captured by a country-good specific total factor 
productivity term ik A . The cost of a bundle of inputs, which consist of labor and 
intermediate goods, is assumed to be the same for all goods within a particular sector 
within a country, but varies across  sectors within a country. This is because within 
countries inputs are mobile across sectors, and goods within a sector employ factors with 
the same intensity; however, goods produced in different sectors vary in their 
intermediate and labor intensities. The cost of an input bundle of producing good k in 
country i as iK c .
17
  Geographic barriers take the convenient “iceberg” form, such that delivering a 
unit from country i to country n, requires producing 
  
ni d >1 units for i n ≠ , and  ii d =1. The 
triangle inequality is assumed to hold (such that for any three countries, i, n, and s, 
si ns ni d d d ≤ ), as well as symmetry  ni in d d = . In addition to these geographic barriers, an 
industry specific ad valorem tariff may be imposed by the importing country. Therefore, 
the total trade cost for country n  to import a good k  from country i  is given 
by ni niK d ) 1 ( τ + . 
  Assuming that production of a particular variety is subject to perfect competition, 
the price a consumer in country n faces for a good k produced in country i is  
                                                 
17 This is one of the departures from Eaton and Kortum (2002) who assume that intermediate shares are the 
same across all goods. In general, the main extension of Eaton and Kortum’s model is the added 











  Consumers have preferences for all varieties within each industry, but are 
indifferent about where they purchase the  good. Therefore, they choose to buy the 
cheapest good available such that the price actually paid for good k by consumers in 
country n is 
(2)  } ... 1 ; min{ ) ( N i p k p nik n = = .  
  Facing these prices, buyers, who could be final consumers or firms buying 
intermediate inputs, purchase individual goods to maximize their respective objective 
functions. Specifically, consumers of final goods maximize 
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where  J Q is a composite industry specific good defined by the following CES function: 
(4) 
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where  0 > σ  is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of goods within a sector and 
is assumed to be the same for all sectors.
18
                                                 
18 One could also assume that the elasticity of substitution is sector specific. Since the term is canceled out 
of the empirical model, the results are not dependent on this assumption.  
 Note that the industry specific composite   18 
goods are non-traded. Assembly takes place by the consumer after purchasing the 
individual varieties from their cheapest sources.   
  Producers, use the K composite intermediate goods as well as labor in order to 
produce a final good. Specifically, for a producer of good k, in country i, the production 
function takes the form 
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KJ KL α α  and  J Q  is defined by equation (4). Here KL α  is the cost share of 
labor, KJ α  is the cost share of composite intermediate J in sector K goods’ production, 
and L is the quantity of labor used.  Given this specification, the cost of an input bundle 



























where iJ p is the price index for composite good J for country i.  
 
3.2 Productivity and Trade Flows 
  Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), a probabilistic representation of 
technological efficiency  is modeled. Assume that country i’s efficiency in producing 
good k is the realization of a random variable  ik A  (drawn independently for each variety) 
from its country and industry specific probability distribution  ] Pr[ ) ( a A a F ik iK ≤ =  which 
is Fréchet (Type II extreme value):    19 
(7)  
θ − − =
a T
iK
iK e a F ) (  
where  0 > iK T  and  . 1 > θ
19
iK T  As Eaton and Kortum (2002) point out,   governs the 
location of the distribution, with higher values indicating that a high efficiency draw is 
more likely. The parameter θ  reflects the amount of variation within the distribution, 
with higher values reflecting less variability.  Moreover, small values of  θ , indicating 
more heterogeneity, imply that relatively higher productivity levels exert a stronger force 
for trade against the resistance imposed by trade barriers. In other words, for small values 
of θ , changes of trade costs result in relatively small changes in trade patterns, which are 
determined primarily by the state of technology iK T .  
 
3.3 Prices 
  The following derivations of price distributions follow those of Eaton and 
Kortum’s (2002) with the only modification being to add the industry dimension to the 
analysis.  
                                                 
19Essentially this formulation allows for within sector and across sector heterogeneity within a country 
which has been a common feature in the literature on trade with heterogeneous firms such as Melitz (2003). 
Also as Donaldson (2010) notes, it is common to assume that productivities are drawn independently across 
varieties, industries, and countries (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Chaney (2008), and Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008). 
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  Given the assumptions on technology and preferences, it is possible to derive an 
expression for the distribution of prices that country i offers to country n in each industry. 
For example for industry K goods, the distribution of prices offered by i to country n is 
)
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  Given these results, Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive three properties of the price 
distributions. The  analogous properties taking into consideration the additional 
dimensionality are presented here. The first property is that the probability that country i 
provides a good in industry K at the lowest price to country n, is given by   
(10) 
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20  Analogous to Eaton and Kortum (2002), this is true since 
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Second, the price of a good k belonging to industry K that country n actually buys from 
any country i also has the distribution ) (p GnK .
21
(11) 
  Third, the exact price index for the CES 
objective function used by both final consumers and firms aggregating varieties to make 
an industry specific composite good is given by 
θ γ
/ 1 − Φ = nK nK p  
where
























3.4 Trade Flows and Empirical Model   
  One implication of the second property derived above is that n’s average 
expenditure on an industry K good purchased does not vary by source, since for goods 
that are purchased conditioning on the source has no bearing in the good’s price. 
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22 Note that consumers and firms in a country have different expenditure shares on goods from a particular 
industry, but since their demand for individual varieties are derived form the same CES objective, they will 
share the same price index for that industry. 
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 = ∫ ∫ nK nK nk nK p dG p dk p p .   22 
Therefore, the fraction of n’s industry K expenditures, spent on goods from country i 
takes the same form as the probability that i provides that good at least cost. 
(12) 
nK
ni niK iK iK
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θ τ ) ) 1 ( ( . nK X  is n’s total spending on industry K goods, and 
niK X  is n’s total spending on K goods from country i. A similar expression can be derived 
for the share of K sector expenditures that are produced by n.  











Dividing equation (12) by (13) gives an expression for the imports of sector K goods 
emanating from country i, relative to n’s expenditures on its own production. 
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  Given this price index defined in (11), one can derive an expression for the 
relative price index of sector J composite goods for two countries: 
(15)  

















An important implication of equation (15) is that if country i systematically has higher 
trade barriers on k goods from other countries relative to an otherwise identical country n, 
it would have a higher price index. Consequently, this would yield a relative cost 
disadvantage to i in production of final goods that made intensive use of this industry.   23 
Moreover, the model shows that countries with systematically smaller trade barriers may 
become relatively more competitive in downstream goods.  
  By expression (12), one can write country i’s share of n’s goods in consumption 
relative to n’s share of its own goods in sector J as 
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Using (16), to substitute out the  nJ iJ Φ Φ / term from (15), the relative price index 
becomes a function of bilateral trade costs and i’s share of n’s goods in consumption 
relative to n’s share of its own goods in sector J: 
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By (6), the relative cost of input bundles to produce a good k is given by 































Finally, using equations (17) and (18), we can rewrite (14) as 




































































Rearranging such that all trade volumes are on the left hand side, the equation becomes  
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  Before presenting the empirical methodology, it is worth taking a closer look at 
the individual components of equation (20). First, note that the denominator term on the 
left hand side serves to normalize trade flows from country i with a comparable measure 
of n’s consumption and use of its own goods. The numerator portion of the left hand side 
variable  represents  n’s  imports from country i  ( niK X )  multiplied by the weighted 
geometric mean of n’s share of i’s consumption ( raised to the total intermediate share in 
production of industry K)  where the weights are the cost shares of each composite 
intermediate. The left hand side term increases when n imports more from i,  and when i 
begins to spend a greater share of intermediate expenditures on goods from country n. 
Trade flows are related to relative productivities, relative wages, and relative trade costs. 









α τ  captures the relative trade costs incurred by i 
in using intermediates from n. The term  ni niK d ) 1 ( τ +  captures n’s additional trade costs of 
importing a good k from i relative to consuming the product from n. 
  I first consider  how the trade flow measure on the left hand side relates 
specifically to measures of vertical specialization commonly used in the literature. To 
make this analogy, consider the simplified case without the added industry dimension.
24
                                                 
24  The essential requirements to go from the disaggregate to the aggregate specification are that all 
industries within a country have the same trade costs, intermediate shares, and productivity distributions. 
 
In this case equation (20) simplifies to    25 
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X represents the share of i’s consumption that comes from country n. 
Since consumers of final goods and firms demanding intermediate goods have the same 
preferences over varieties, the share of consumption by final consumers is also equal to 
the share of consumption of intermediates by firms. Therefore, the left hand side variable 
may also be written as 
(22)














































































where INTER refers to the value of intermediate goods and OUTPUT refers to the value 















, bears some resemblance to the bilateral counterpart measure of vertical specialization 











ES NTERMEDIAT IMPORTED I
IMPORTS VS . When labor’s share is 0, equation 
(23) exactly equals VS. However, when labor’s share is 1, the measure is simply equal to   26 
n’s imports from i. Therefore, vertical specialization is nested within the trade flow term 
as an extreme case.   
  Another feature implied by the model is the magnified effect of bilateral trade 
liberalization when trade is vertically specialized. For example, assuming that tariffs and 
tariff changes are the same in both countries, i.e. t int nit τ τ τ = = , 
then )) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ln(
) ln(
L d
lhs d α θ τ − + − = + . The intermediate share of production 
intensifies the effect of bilateral tariff liberalizations. Moreover, liberalizations in 
industries with greater intermediate intensity will see a larger effect on trade flows. 
Finally,  the  model suggests an exact measure of bilateral trade flows that is 
appropriate when measuring the response of trade liberalizations in a multi-country world 
where countries have different rates of tariff liberalization and different preferential 
agreements.  The measure of bilateral trade flows developed is one that is independent of 




  Moreover, the empirical equation does not require a multilateral 
trade resistance term as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
4. Data and Empirical Strategy  
  Taking the natural log of (20) produces the model to be estimated: 
                                                 
25 The strategy employed in this paper was to come up with just such a measure. In Eaton and Kortum 
(2002), a similar strategy was employed to derive a bilateral trade flow measure that was independent of 
the exporting country’s trade barriers.    27 
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26
                                                 
26 The derivation of this specification requires two important assumptions. First, factor cost shares within 
an industry are assumed to be the same across countries (i.e. that all countries share the same technology 
but only differ in productivity draws). Also required is the assumption that the parameter
 As can be seen from 
the above equation, bilateral trade flows depend on both the importing country and 
exporting country tariffs and geographic barriers, with the exporting country barriers 
becoming relatively more important in deterring bilateral vertically specialized trade the 
greater the intermediate share in production.  This specification then allows one to 
estimate the main parameters of the model, as well as to quantify exactly how important 
the greater liberalizations experienced by the least developed countries has contributed to 
their greater growth rates in U.S. trade. In order to accomplish this, the model looks 
specifically at how tariffs on intermediate goods imposed by countries exporting to the 
U.S. as well as U.S. tariff preferences impact the degree of bilateral trade as measured by 
the left hand side variable. Therefore in estimating the specification suggested by 
equation (24), n will represent the United States. Countries denoted by i are all other 
trading partners with the United States for which all necessary data are available. The 
analysis includes data over  the period 1989-2001 such that variables are also time 
specific. 
θ , which governs 
the variation in the distribution of productivities, is the same across countries. This essentially requires that 
all countries’ trade to tariff elasticities be the same regardless of development level.    28 
  The left hand side variables are calculated using data from the World Bank’s 
Trade and Production Database, 1976-2004.
27  This database contains measures of 
output, and bilateral imports and exports for 28 manufacturing industries defined at the 
three digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 2 level for an 
unbalanced panel of countries.
28
  U.S. consumption of own production in year t,
 Output and trade volumes are summed into ten separate 
industries: (1) food/beverages/tobacco, (2) textiles/apparel/leather, (3) wood/paper, (4) 
chemicals/plastics/rubber, (5) petroleum/coal, (6) pottery/glass/non-metallic mineral 
products, (7) iron/steel/metal products, (8) machinery/scientific equipment, and  (9) 
transport equipment, (10) other. Therefore, an industry K corresponds to one of these 10 
industries. 
nnKt X , is measured as output less 
manufacturing exports. Total industry expenditures for a country i  in year t, iKt X , is 
measured as output plus net imports in that industry. Bilateral trade with the United 
States  are measured by U.S.  reported trade, where inKt X represents U.S.  exports to i, 
                                                 
27 The econometric analysis does not extend beyond 2001, as this is the last year U.S. production data are 
reported in the database. 
28The production data from this database were collected by UNIDO and OECD through their joint annual 
collection program of general industrial statistics. However, the production data from UNIDO are subject 
to differences in national classifications and assumptions are applied in order to convert from the national 
(country specific) industrial classification into the ISIC classification. These problems, which undermine 
the international comparability of the data, are generally more pronounced at the more disaggregate level. 
See Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), and Yamada (2005).   29 
and niKt X  represents U.S. imports from i in industry K.  Country i’s consumption in an 
industry, iKt X , is measured as output plus net imports in that industry. 
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002) annual compensation is adjusted for 
education to measure wages in efficiency units. Specifically, wages are given by 
it H
it it e comp w
06 . *
− = where .06 is an estimate of the return to education,  it H  is the 
average years of schooling of the adult population for country i and  it comp  is a measure 
of compensation.
 29,30
                                                 
29 Eaton and Kortum (2002) use annual compensation per worker in manufacturing for their OECD sample, 
and adjust this measure for worker quality in the same manner. They reference Bils and Klenow (2000) as 
sources for this particular measure of the return to education.  
  In order to preserve as many observations as possible, the 
preferred measure for worker compensation in a particular year is nominal GDP per 
worker, translated from local currency units to dollars using average annual exchange 
rates. GDP data are taken from the World Development Indicators, and the number of 
workers in a particular year is estimated using data from the Penn World Tables 6.3 
obtained by dividing the variable Real GDP purchasing power parity (Chain Index) by 
the real GDP per worker. Because GDP data may be a noisy measure, as an alternative, I 
first use hourly compensation taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics International 
30 Data on educational attainment is taken from Barro and Lee (2001). The measure used is the average 
years of education for the population age 15 and up. Because the data are only available at five year 
intervals, the measure for a given year is used for that year as well as the for the immediate two prior and 
subsequent years.   30 
Labor Comparison (ILC) program also translated in to current U.S. dollars using average 
annual exchange rates. I show that results are robust to both measures. 








T ln , is estimated with a 
country and industry fixed effect and is assumed to be constant across time.
31
  U.S.  tariff data are taken from the United States Trade Commission’s Tariff 
Database. The database includes the ad valorem, specific, and estimated ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs based on the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. In addition, the file 
indicates commodities that are eligible for tariff preference programs and the applicable 
tariffs under these programs. The estimated ad valorem equivalent tariff for a particular 
country applicable under the relevant preference program is used as a measure for U.S. 
tariffs. If a country/good qualifies for more than one preference program, the minimum 
tariff of all qualifying programs is used. These data are available for commodity 
descriptions at the HTS 8-digit level which are then concorded with the ISIC Revision 2 
classifications and then aggregated to the industry level noted above.  
 This fixed 
effect also subsumes the distance term capturing relative transportation costs, also 
assumed to be constant across time. 
  Ideally, the tariff data for each country would be measured as the average tariff 
imposed specifically on the United States.  For all countries  except for Mexico and 
Canada tariff data are taken from the World Bank’s Trade and Production Database, 
                                                 
31 An alternative strategy would be to transform the equation to a first difference; however, because for 
many observations data in consecutive years are not available in the panel, there is quite a bit of attrition 
under this specification resulting in nearly half of the sampled observations being dropped.    31 
1976-2004, which reports several measures of ad valorem tariff rates. The measure used 
in this paper is the import weighted MFN tariff. Canadian and Mexican tariffs imposed 
on U.S. goods under CUSFTA and NAFTA are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Integrated Trade Solution Database. 
  The final specification is given by 
(25)  iKt iK niKt inKt niKt
nnKt
niKt ustariff owntariff relwage
X
X
ε η β β β β + + + + + = 3 2 1 0 ~
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) 1 ln( τ α ,  iKt ustariff ) 1 ln( niKt τ + = , and  iKt ε  is the 
random error term.
32  In the empirical estimation, production function parameters are 
measured using the U.S. production data as a benchmark. Labor’s share in a particular 
industry is calculated as the average share of wages in output for the U.S. sample, in a 
particular industry. These measures are reported in Table 5.
33
                                                 
32 This specification bears some resemblance to recent empirical models of Romalis  (2004) and Nunn  
(2007), among others, who have sought to measure the importance of interactions between country and 
industry specific factors as sources of comparative advantage. Romalis  (2004) tests the importance of 
factor abundance interacted with factor intensity measures and Nunn (2007) extends the model to consider 
the importance of contract enforcement for contract intensive industries. 
 Total intermediate share is 
33 In the original specification, the model follows Eaton and Kortum (2002) and ignores capital as an input, 
allowing for intermediates to play a similar role in the production function. Under this specification, the 
total intermediate share is one minus labor’s share. Additional controls for relative capital costs and 








 Individual intermediate industry cost shares, KJ α , are calculated 
using the U.S. Input-Output data also provided by World Bank’s Trade and Production 
Database, 1976-2004.   The theory requires that 0 3 2 1 < − = = = θ β β β . In other words the 
parameter  θ  which governs the variation of the distribution of productivity, with less 
variability implying a bigger θ , determines by how much trade flows respond to changes 
in relative wages, tariffs, and other cost variables. This restriction is not imposed in the 
empirical estimates but I do test for whether or not the coefficients are statistically 
different from each other.  
 
5. Results 
  The final data set for which all data for specification (25) are available consists of 
an unbalanced panel of 56 trading partner countries when GDP data are used to calculate 
compensation and 26 countries when hourly compensation measures from the ILC data 
are used. In all regressions robust standard errors are clustered by country and industry.  
Results using hourly compensation to calculate wages are reported in the first four 
columns of Table 6. In the baseline regression of Column 1, the coefficients of both tariff 
terms and wages have the expected negative and significant coefficient. However, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients are not equal as can be seen by the test of equality at the 
bottom of the column.  
  In the next few columns, several additional control variables are progressively 
added. The first modification deals with the concern of whether or not the relative state of   33 
technology can reasonably be assumed to stay constant across time.
34  Relative wages 
and relative levels of productivity are expected to be correlated so incorrect measurement 
of the relative state of technology could induce a bias especially on the relative wage 
term. Therefore, it is  assumed  that relative productivity growth is the same for all 
industries within a country and the state of technology is proxied by estimating a country 
and year specific Total Factor Productivity (TFP) term. This measure is calculated as the 
residual from the regression of the natural log of real GDP on both the natural log of the 
real capital stock and the available labor force which is also measured in efficiency 
units.
35, 36
                                                 
34  Changes in technology may be especially important as suggested by recent research by Keane and 
Feinberg (2007) who argue that the advent of improved logistics management practices, including the 'just-
in-time' (JIT) production system, can explain much of the growth of intra-firm trade. Lileeva and Trefler 
(2007) argue that tariff cuts can be effective especially in conjunction with new technologies such as just-
in-time delivery. 
 Regression 2 of Table 6 contains the results for the specification that includes 
the natural log of the relative TFP term. As can be seen, this term has the expected 
positive sign and is statistically significant. However, the relative wage term decreases in 
absolute value.  
35 Specifically, the available labor force in country i in year t is given by
it H
it it e pop L
06 . * = . 
36 Data and documentation used to construct TFP measures were obtained from a database provided by 
Adalmir Marquetti at http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/epwt/. These data are based on the 
extensions of the Penn World Tables 6.2. Because the Penn World Tables do not currently have capital 
stock data, the standardized capital stock measure is obtained by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method 
to the investment series computed from the variable Real Investment Share of GDP.   34 
  In the third column a control for capital market development is added. Therefore 
in measuring the input shares, while labor’s share is still calculated as the share of wages 
in output, capital’s share is calculated as the value added share of output minus labor’s 
share, and the total intermediate share is calculated as 1 minus the value added share of 
output. Table 8 summarizes the factor cost shares.  The control for financial development 
is the capital share in industry K interacted with the natural log of the relative private 
bank credit to GDP ratio.
37
  Since the data using hourly compensation are limited primarily to developed 
countries, I now check to see if the GDP per capita make for a reasonable proxy. In 
Column 5, the same regression is performed using the same sample used in Column 4. As 
can be seen the coefficients are almost identical. In fact the correlation  coefficient 
between the two relwage measures is .94 and significant at the 1 percent level. Therefore, 
in all of the following regressions, I use the GDP per worker measure to calculate wages.  
 As can be seen no major changes are attained except that the 
two tariff terms are no longer statistically different from each other. Finally, added to the 
regression is a dummy for the Canadian U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  to control for other trade 
liberalizations specific to these free trade agreements that went beyond the scope of tariff 
decreases but which were  likely correlated.  The dummy is one for all Canadian 
observations and 1 for all Mexican observations for 1994 and later. Column 4 shows no 
significant changes.  
                                                 
37 Relative bank credit to GDP data are taken from the Financial Structure Dataset. See Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2009).   35 
In the final column of Table 6, the same variables are used but with the additional 
observations for  which GDP per worker data are available. The main effect is to 
completely remove all significance on the relwage term. In the previous five regressions 
wage  coefficients were  consistently lower than the theory suggested.  Adding a large 
amount of developing countries to the sample  tends to exacerbate the  problem. One 
concern is that wages are inherently endogenous and that the wage term is picking up part 
of the productivity effect that is being captured in the error term. The analysis so far has 
attempted to control for country and industry specific differences in productivity with 
fixed effects, and with an estimate of TFP that is year and country specific for changes in 
technology across time. To control for any additional omitted variable bias,  an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) procedure is employed.  Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), 
two primary instruments for relative wages are used: the  natural logs of the relative 
supply of workers, measured in efficiency units, and the relative population density.
38
                                                 
38 Labor supply for country i measured in efficiency units is measured as
 In 
the IV estimation, these  primary instruments are used as well as the corresponding 
interaction with labor’s share to instrument for the interaction of the natural log of 
relative wages with labor’s share. The IV results are presented in Regression 2 of Table 
9. As can be seen, the result is a significant and larger, in absolute value, coefficient with 
the expected negative sign. In addition, the Hausman test of exogeneity rejects the null of 
exogeneity at the 1 percent level. The exclusion restrictions for the instruments are also 
met at the 1 percent level. The tariff terms remain statistically significant and the test of 
it H
it it e pop L
06 . * = . Population 
density is measured as the population divided by land area.   36 
equality of the coefficients of the two tariff terms and the relwage term cannot be rejected 
at the 1 percent level. Therefore, these results do adhere to the restrictions of the Eaton 
and Kortum theory. 
  To check the robustness of the  results,  outcomes from three alternative 
regressions are reported in Table 9. To insure that the NAFTA countries do not make an 
important difference in Column 1 of Table 9, Canada and Mexico are dropped as well as 
the CUSFTA/NAFTA dummy.  In the second regression, all observations pertaining to 
the textile industry are dropped. This is because the textile industry has historically been 
subjected to substantial non-tariff barriers, and consequently tariffs may not accurately 
measure trade restrictions in this industry. In the third specification, the relwage term is 
replaced by the relative labor supply interacted with labor intensity.
39
  Finally, in Table 10, the regression is performed with only high income countries 
in the sample. This alternative is to allow for the possibility that high income countries 
may have a different degree of technological heterogeneity than low income countries 
suggesting that the regression (25) would only be appropriate for high income countries. 
The results are compared to the full sample without the CUSFTA/NAFTA dummy since 
this would not be identified in the full sample. The only changes are that the financial 
 No significantly 
different results are attained. In the first two regressions the U.S. tariff is marginally 
lower and the owntariff term is marginally higher. In the third regression, the relative 
labor supply interaction is positive and significant as expected.  
                                                 
39 This specification is directly related to that of Romalis (2004), Levechenko (2007), and Nunn (2007) who 
interact factor intensities with factor abundance.   37 
development control variable is insignificant for the selected sample and the owntariff 
terms is marginally less significant. 
In all specifications the coefficient on U.S. tariffs is marginally larger than that of 
exporting country tariffs; however, as was noted in the descriptive statistics, U.S. 
liberalizations have been relatively moderate especially in comparison to the substantial 
liberalizations by the least developed countries. In order to study the suggested effects of 
actual trade liberalization for the sample, the implied change in trade suggested by the 
model is calculated over the widest time frame for which exporting country tariff data are 
available. The specification used is that of Regression 2 of Table 8. These results are 
given in Table 11. As can be seen, for especially some countries their own liberalizations 
have been relatively more important. For example, the impact of China’s own 
liberalizations, with an average increase to the left hand side variable of .490, was over 
6.7 times the effect of U.S. tariff liberalization with only an implied increase to the left 
hand side variable of .073. Taking the average effect of tariff liberalizations across 
countries, Table 12 shows that on average exporting country liberalizations have been an 
important source of comparative advantage and quantitatively more important than U.S. 
liberalizations. For the entire sample, countries’ own liberalization was 2.3 times larger 
than U.S. liberalization. However, for the least developed countries, their own 
liberalizations have been on average 4.2 times more important than U.S. liberalizations 
and for lower middle income countries their own liberalizations have been 2.6 times as 
large. For high income countries, U.S.  tariff decreases have had a marginally  larger 
effect, on average.    38 
 
6. Conclusion   
  Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, many developing countries erected highly 
protected trade regimes in the hopes of expanding the industrial sectors of their 
economies.  The standard rationale behind protectionist measures falls under the infant 
industry argument which theorizes that protectionism will allow an infant industry to 
grow and develop to the point at which it can compete on international markets without 
protectionist measures. Other proponents of trade protection argue that domestic firms 
should be more able to invest in new infrastructure and modern production techniques if 
guaranteed protection from foreign competition. While developing countries have for 
some time adhered to the more conventional wisdom that greater openness to foreign 
competition induces both productivity and welfare gains, developing countries have only 
recently begun to abandon development through protection policies. For some countries 
recent trade liberalizations have been substantial and have also coincided with large 
export growth rates which have far outpaced those of high income countries.  
  This paper was in part motivated by the observation that U.S. imports from less 
developed countries are becoming increasingly important in U.S. trade, and consequently 
imply that when analyzing trade growth limiting one’s sample to a balanced panel of the 
most developed countries at the time, may result in neglecting important sources and 
causes of trade growth. This paper investigates whether or not the more pronounced 
export growth of less developed countries is related to recent trade liberalizations by 
promoting the development of vertical production networks.    39 
  To investigate this hypothesis, I build and estimate an empirical model that is 
guided by extensions of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model. The objective is to relate an 
appropriate measure of bilateral trade, which correctly controls for trade policies with 
other countries, to both importing and exporting country tariff policy. The results suggest 
that both intermediate tariffs imposed by countries exporting to the United States as well 
as U.S. tariffs matter for trade. Higher U.S. tariffs are associated with less trade, and 
countries with low intermediate tariffs tend to have higher levels of trade as measured in 
this paper. Empirical studies estimating trade elasticities have tended to focus on importer 
barriers and not to directly measure the importance of exporter country policies. My 
results indicate that especially for less developed countries who have historically had 
much more protected trade regimes, their own liberalizations have been relatively more 
important than U.S. tariffs, which in turn have been quite moderate.      40 
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Bangladesh Costa Rica United Kingdom
China Malaysia Italy





Sri Lanka Uruguay Belgium
Cameroon Trinidad and Tobago Australia
Indonesia Venezuela Netherlands
Ivory Coast Mauritius Hong Kong
Honduras Argentina Austria
Philippines Gabon Japan
Egypt South Korea  Iceland











Growth of US Imports/Output and US Tafiff Liberalization 1989-2001














1989-2001 ∆ln(US imports/US output) ∆ln(1+tariff) Trade to Tariff Elasticity
0.58 -0.02 -33.57






Implied Trade Elasticities of US Manufacturing Imports/US Manufacturing Output to US Gross Tariffs
1989-2001 1989-2001
Country/Country Group ∆ln(US imports/US output) ∆ln(1+tariff) Elasticity
World 0.578 -0.017 -33.57
Canada 0.487 -0.041 -11.84
Mexico 1.444 -0.027 -54.02
China 2.117 -0.008 -266.64
Least Developed
1 1.015 -0.008 -133.68
Lower Middle Income
2 0.848 -0.006 -138.90
Upper Middle Income
3 0.453 -0.007 -67.39
High Income
4 0.230 -0.007 -32.80
Tariff measure is import weighted average US ad valorem equivalent tariff across manufacturing  industries.
1 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) <$3000 (excluding China)
2 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) between $3000 and $10,000 (excluding Mexico)
3 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) between $10000 and $18,000 






Trends in Tariffs by Country/Country Group
∆ln(1+tariff)
Country/Country Group 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  percent
World 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 -6.04%
0.30 0.24 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 1989-2001
Canada 0.07 . . . 0.03 . . . 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.71%
0.06 . . . 0.03 . . . 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1989-2001
Mexico . . 0.13 . . . 0.06 . . . 0.04 . . -8.17%
. . 0.03 . . . 0.06 . . . 0.05 . . 1991-1999
China . . . 0.47 0.45 0.41 . 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17 -22.46%
. . . 0.31 0.31 0.30 . 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 1992-2001
Least Developed
1 0.76 0.60 . 0.49 0.15 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.19 -39.32%
0.62 0.49 . 0.44 0.09 0.35 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.14 1989-2001
Lower Middle Income
2
0.32 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.14 -14.62%
0.19 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.14 1989-2001
Upper Middle Income
3 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 -5.07%
0.12 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 1989-2001
High Income
4 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 -3.01%
0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 1989-2001
Notes: For all countries except Mexico and Canada the tariff measure is the average import weighted MFN tariff for manfufacturing industries with standard 
 deviations in italics. For Mexico and Canada, the tariff  reported is the average tariff imposed on U.S. manufacturing products under NAFTA and CUSFTA.
1 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) <$3000 (excluding China)
2 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) between $3000 and $10,000 (excluding Mexico)
3 All countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) between $10000 and $18,000 






Average labor share of output by manufacturing sector, US production   
Industry Labor Share
1
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.07
Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 0.19
Wood Products, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 0.19
Products of Petroleum and Coal 0.05
Chemical, Plastic, and Rubber Products 0.15
Pottery, Glass, and other Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.23
Basic Iron, Steel, and Metal Products 0.15












1 GDP per worker
2 
Sample from (4) Full sample
OLS without capital inputs  OLS with capital inputs     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
coef st error coef st error coef st error coef st error coef st error coef st error
relwage -3.23*** 0.64 -2.92*** 0.59 -2.26*** 0.58 -2.17*** 0.57 -2.17*** 0.56 -0.94 0.65
ustar -11.41*** 1.93 -11.82*** 1.97 -9.43*** 1.85 -9.30*** 1.81 -8.73*** 1.85 -8.13*** 1.64
owntariff -5.68*** 1.06 -5.18*** 1.07 -7.05*** 2.03 -6.50*** 2.05 -5.74*** 2.10 -6.35*** 1.47
ln relative TFP     1.24** 0.54 1.39*** 0.50 1.46*** 0.50 1.72*** 0.52 1.23** 0.55
capital share*ln relative credit to GDP 0.72*** 0.27 0.70** 0.27 0.71*** 0.27 1.06*** 0.25
CUSFTA/NAFTA  0.64*** 0.16 0.68*** 0.16 0.64*** 0.17
     
country/industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 (within) 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.06
no obs 1398 1398 1320 1320 1320 2268
 
Linear Restrictions:  
HO: relwage=ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0028 0
Accept or Reject at 1% level Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject
           
HO: ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.0046 0.0021 0.4062 0.3252 0.2953 0.4253
Accept or Reject at 1% level Reject   Reject Accept Accept Accept Accept
1 relwage term calculated using hourly compensation.
2 relwage term calculated using GDP per worker.
Robust standard errors are clustered by country and industry.
***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.











Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.07 0.47 0.45
Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 0.19 0.29 0.53
Wood Products, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 0.19 0.30 0.51
Products of Petroleum and Coal 0.05 0.19 0.76
Chemical, Plastic, and Rubber Products 0.15 0.38 0.47
Pottery, Glass, and other Non-metallic Mineral Products 0.23 0.38 0.39
Basic Iron, Steel, and Metal Products 0.15 0.24 0.61
Fabricated Metal Products and Professional and Scientific Equipment 0.21 0.35 0.44
Transport equipment 0.15 0.24 0.61
Other 0.21 0.34 0.45
Mean 0.16 0.32 0.52
1 Labor share is caluclated as labor payments/output.   
2 Captial Share is calculated as value added/output - labor share.      








OLS and second stage IV estimates coef st error coef st error
relwage -0.94 0.65 -4.98** 2.48
ustar -8.13*** 1.64 -6.73*** 1.79
owntariff -6.35*** 1.47 -5.15*** 1.68
ln relative TFP 1.23** 0.55 1.45** 0.64
capital share*ln relative credit to GDP 1.06*** 0.25 1.22*** 0.26
CUSFTA/NAFTA 0.64*** 0.17 0.55* 0.19
labor share*ln relative labor supply
country/industry dummies yes yes
First stage IV estimates:
ln relative labor supply  -0.03 0.08
ln relative labor supply*labor share -1.60** 0.61
ln relative population density 0.01 0.09
ln relative population density*labor share 2.66*** 0.70
no obs 2268 2204
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.0003
Over-id test (p-value) 0.0244
Linear Restrictions:
HO: relwage=ustar=owntar (p-value) 0 0.7469
Accept or Reject at 1% level Reject Accept
 
HO: ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.4253 0.4800
Accept or Reject at 1% level Accept Accept
Robust standard errors are clustered by country and industry.






IV IV IV OLS
Full Sample No NAFTA  No Textiles  Relative labor 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First and second stage IV estimates coef st error coef st error coef st error coef st error
relwage -4.98** 2.48 -5.45** 2.42 -5.50* 2.89
ustar -6.73*** 1.79 -5.43*** 1.80 -5.40*** 1.81 -8.97*** 1.65
owntariff -5.15*** 1.68 -4.67*** 1.67 -5.02*** 1.80 -6.39*** 1.42
ln relative TFP 1.45** 0.64 1.42** 0.66 1.39* 0.74 1.25** 0.53
capital share*ln relative credit to GDP 1.22*** 0.26 1.29*** 0.28 1.14*** 0.29 1.00*** 0.24
CUSFTA/NAFTA 0.55* 0.19   0.38*** 0.14 0.62*** 0.16
labor share*ln relative labor supply 7.78** 3.94
country/industry dummies yes yes yes yes
First stage IV estimates:
ln relative labor supply  -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.08
ln relative labor supply*labor share -1.60** 0.61 -1.71*** 0.62 -1.54** 0.64
ln relative population density 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.10
ln relative population density*labor share 2.66*** 0.70 2.91*** 0.69 2.61*** 0.75
no obs 2204 2111 1952 2268
 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
Over-id test (p-value) 0.0244 0.0389 0.0633
Linear Restrictions:
HO: relwage=ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.7469 0.9419 0.9853
Accept or Reject at 1% level Accept Accept Accept
HO: ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.4800 0.7389 0.8719 0.07
Accept or Reject at 1% level Accept Accept Accept Accept
Robust standard errors are clustered by country and industry.







Full Sample High Income
1
(1) (2)
First and second stage IV estimates coef st error coef st error
relwage -4.98** 2.48 -4.33** 1.93
ustar -6.73*** 1.79 -6.62*** 2.52
owntariff -5.15*** 1.68 -5.73* 3.46
ln relative TFP 1.45** 0.64 1.85** 0.80
capital share*ln relative credit to GDP 1.22*** 0.26 0.60 0.38
CUSFTA/NAFTA 0.55* 0.19
country/industry dummies yes yes
First stage IV estimates:
ln relative labor supply  -0.03 0.08 -0.16* 0.08
ln relative labor supply*labor share -1.60** 0.61 -1.16* 0.65
ln relative population density 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.09
ln relative population density*labor share 2.66*** 0.70 3.38*** 0.57
no obs 2204 1023
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.0003 0.0889
Over-id test (p-value) 0.0244 0.4989
Linear Restrictions:
HO: relwage=ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.7469 0.827
Accept or Reject at 1% level Accept Accept
HO: ustar=owntar (p-value) 0.4800 0.8008
Accept or Reject at 1% level Accept Accept  
1 Only countries with 1989 per capita GDP (Constant 2005 dollars) greater than $18,000 in sample.
Robust standard errors are clustered by country and industry.





Table 11 Average predicted effect of tariff liberalization, by country
Country Name Time Frame ∆lhs -6.73*∆lnustar -5.15*∆owntariff Income
1 Country Name Time Frame ∆lhs -6.73*∆lnustar -5.15*∆owntariff Income
1
Bangladesh 1989-2000 . 0.067 1.281 1 South Africa 1990-2001 . 0.197 0.071 2
Bolivia 1993-2001 . -0.030 0.015 1 Sri Lanka 1990-2001 . 0.069 0.315 2
China 1992-2001 . 0.073 0.490 1 Thailand 1989-2001 . 0.070 0.411 2
Ghana 1993-2000 . 0.073 -0.143 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1991-2001 . -0.019 0.204 2
India 1990-2001 1.485 0.069 0.710 1 Tunisia 1990-1998 . 0.058 -0.028 2
Kenya 1994-2001 1.328 0.075 0.262 1 Turkey 1993-1999 0.85 0.073 0.071 2
Malawi 1994-2001 . 0.075 0.324 1 Uruguay 1992-2001 . 0.055 -0.159 2
Nepal 1993-2000 . 0.073 -0.037 1 Venezuela 1992-2000 . 0.052 0.084 2
Nigeria 1989-2001 . 0.200 0.087 1 Greece 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 3
Pakistan 1995-2001 . 0.082 0.606 1 Hungary 1991-1997 0.74 0.049 0.075 3
Tanzania 1993-2000 . 0.073 0.023 1 Ireland 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 3
Uganda 1994-2001 . 0.075 0.189 1 South Korea 1989-1999 0.11 0.069 0.142 3
Algeria 1993-2001 . 0.074 0.051 2 Malta 1997-2000 0.39 0.007 -0.001 3
Argentina 1992-2001 . 0.055 -0.020 2 New Zealand 1992-2000 . 0.068 0.164 3
Brazil 1989-2001 . 0.070 0.471 2 Portugal 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 3
Cameroon 1994-2001 . 0.075 -0.005 2 Taiwan 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.143 3
Chile 1992-2001 . 0.055 0.072 2 Australia 1991-2001 -0.13 0.075 0.167 4
Colombia 1991-2001 . 0.088 -0.123 2 Austria 1990-2001 . 0.072 0.154 4
Costa Rica 1995-2001 0.260 -0.006 0.108 2 Belgium 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Ecuador 1993-1999 0.659 -0.033 -0.088 2 Canada 1989-2001 1.30 0.247 0.209 4
Egypt 1995-1998 0.415 0.071 0.106 2 Denmark 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
El Salvador 1995-2001 . -0.006 0.066 2 Germany 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Gabon 1995-2001 . 0.186 0.009 2 Finland 1992-2001 . 0.073 0.056 4
Guatemala 1995-2001 . -0.006 0.062 2 France 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Honduras 1995-2001 . -0.006 0.028 2 Iceland 1993-2001 . 0.074 0.038 4
Indonesia 1989-2001 . 0.070 0.259 2 Italy 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Ivory Coast 1993-2001 . 0.076 0.301 2 Japan 1989-2001 0.14 0.075 0.041 4
Jordan 2000-2001 0.459 0.002 0.173 2 Netherlands 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Malaysia 1991-2001 1.160 -0.067 0.100 2 Norway 1993-2001 0.35 0.074 0.087 4
Mauritius 1995-1998 0.445 0.071 0.139 2 Oman 1992-1997 . 0.045 0.034 4
Mexico 1991-2001 . 0.120 0.226 2 Singapore 1989-2001 0.16 0.075 0.041 4
Morocco 1993-2001 0.324 0.076 0.529 2 Spain 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Panama 1997-2001 . 0.007 0.146 2 Sweden 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.004 4
Peru 1993-2000 . -0.032 0.114 2 Switzerland 2000-2001 . 0.005 0.000 4
Philippines 1989-2001 . 0.070 0.464 2 United Kingdom 1989-2001 . 0.075 0.071 4
Poland 1991-2001 . 0.058 0.004 2
Sampled over observations with data for own country tariffs. Observations are average across industries.Countries are divided into income groups by 1989 per capita GDP






Average predicted effect of tariff liberalization, by income group  
   
Income Group mean ∆lhs -6.73*(mean ∆lnustar) -5.15*(mean ∆owntariff)  
Least Developed
1 1.44 0.08 0.32
120 observations 1.06 0.10 0.42
Lower Middle Income
2 0.66 0.05 0.13
320 observations 0.99 0.10 0.19
Upper Middle Income
3 0.33 0.06 0.09
80 observations 0.89 0.10 0.07
High Income
4 0.51 0.08 0.07
190 observations 1.03 0.11 0.07
Total 0.64 0.06 0.14
  1.02 0.11 0.24
Obervations from Table 11 have been averaged by income group. Standard deviations in italics.
Sampled over observations with data for own country tariffs. Observations are average across industries.
Countries are divided into income groups by 1989 per capita GDP (constant 2005 dollars): 1 less than $3,000,
 2 between $3,000 and $10,000, 3 between $10,000 and $18,000, and 4 higher than $10,000.
 
    
  52 
References 
Anderson, M. A., Balistreri, E. J., Fox, A. K., and Hillberry, R. H., 2005. Taste Parameters as 
Model Residuals: Assessing the ‘Fit’ of an Armington Trade Model. Review of 
International Economics 13, 973--984. 
Anderson, James E., and Eric van Wincoop. 2003. “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to 
the Border Puzzle.” American Economic Review, 90(1): 170–192. 
Baier, Scott L., and Jeffrey H. Bergstrand. 2001. “The Growth of World Trade: Tariffs, 
Transport Costs, and Income Similarity.” Journal of International Economics 
53(1): 1–27.   
Baldwin, Richard E., and Anthony J. Venables. 1995. “Regional Economic Integration.” 
In  Handbook of International Economics Volume 3, ed. G. Grossman and K. 
Rogoff, 1597–1644. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee. 2001. “International  Data on Educational 
Attainment: Updates and Implications.” Oxford Economic Papers, 53(3): 541–
563. 
Beck , Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine. 2009. “Financial Institutions and 
Markets across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis.” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 4943. 
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen. 2004a. “Entry, Expansion and Intensity in the 
U.S. Export Boom, 1987–1992.” Review of International Economics, 12(4): 662–
675.    
  53 
Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen. 2004b. “Why some Firms Export.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 86(2): 561–569. 
Bils, Mark, and Peter J. Klenow. 2000. “Does Schooling Cause Growth?” American 
Economic Review, 90(5): 1160–1183. 
Brock, William A., and Stephen P. Magee. 1978. “The Economics of Special Interest 
Politics: The Case of the Tariff.” American Economic Review, 68(2): 246–50. 
Broda, Christian, and David E. Weinstein. 2006. “Globalization and the Gains from 
Variety.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 541–585. 
Brown, Drussilla K., Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert Stern. 1995. “Estimates of a North 
America Free Trade Agreement.” In Modeling North American Economic 
Integration, ed. P. J. Kehoe and T. J. Kehoe, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Chaney, Thomas. 2008. “Distorted Gravity: the Intensive and Extensive Margins of 
International Trade.” American Economic Review, 98(4): 1707–21. 
Chor, Davin. 2009. “Unpacking Sources of Comparative Advantage.” Singapore 
Management University School of Economics & Social Sciences Working Paper. 
Clausing, Kimberly. 2001. “Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the Canada-United 
States Free trade Agreement.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 34(3): 677–696. 
Coe, David, and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. “International R&D Spillovers.” European 
Economic Review, 39(5): 859–887. 
Das, Sanghamitra, Mark Roberts, and James Tybout. 2007. “Market Entry Costs, 
Producer Heterogeneity, and Export Dynamics.” Econometrica, 75(3): 837–873.    
  54 
Deardorff, Alan, and Robert Stern. 1990. “Computational Analysis of Global Trading 
Arrangements.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Debaere, Peter. 2003. “Monopolistic Competition and Trade Revisited: Testing the Mode 
without Testing for Gravity.” Journal of International Economics, 66(1): 249–66. 
Debaere, Peter, and Shalah Mostashari. 2010. “Do Tariffs Matter for the Extensive 
Margin of Trade? An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of International Economics 
81(2): 163–169.  
Donaldson, Dave. 2008. “Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation 
Infrastructure.” Mimeograph, London School of Economics.  
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Stanley Fischer, and Paul Samuelson. 1977. “Comparative 
Advantage, Trade, and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of 
Goods.” American Economic Review, 67(5): 823–29. 
Eaton, Jonathan, and Samuel Kortum. 2002. “Technology, Geography and Trade.” 
Econometrica, 70(5): 1741–1780. 
Feenstra, Robert. 1998. "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4): 31–50. 
Feenstra, Robert, and Gordon Hanson. 1996a.  “Foreign Investment, Outsourcing and 
Relative Wages.” In Political Economy of Trade Policy: Essays in Honor of 
Jagdish Bhagwati, ed.  Robert Feenstra, Gene Grossman, and Douglas Irwing. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Feenstra, Robert, and Gordon Hanson. 1996b. “Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage 
Inequality.” American Economic Review, 86(2): 240–245.    
  55 
Feenstra, Robert, and Gordon Hanson. 1999. “Productivity Measurement and the Impact 
of Trade and Technology on Wages: Estimates for the U.S. 1972-1990.” NBER 
Working Paper 6052. 
Feenstra, Robert, and Hiau Looi Kee. 2007. “Trade Liberalization and Export Variety: A 
Comparison of Mexico and China.” The World Economy, 30(1): 5–21. 
Feinberg, Susan, and Michael Keane. 2001. “U.S.-Canada Trade Liberalization and MNC 
Production Location.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(1): 118–132. 
Feinberg, Susan, and Michael Keane. 2009. “Tariff Effects on MNC Decisions to Engage 
in Intra-firm and Arm's-length trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(3): 
900–929. 
Findlay, Ronald, and Stanislaw Wellisz. 1982. “Endogenous Tariffs, the Political 
Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare.” In Import Competition and 
Response, ed. Ronald Findlay and Stanislaw Wellisz, 223–244. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Helpman, Elhanan .1987. “Imperfect Competition and International Trade: Evidence 
from Fourteen Industrial Countries.” Journal of Japanese and International 
Economics, 1(1): 62–81. 
Helpman, Elhanan, Marc Melitz, and Yona Rubinstein. 2008. “Estimating Trade Flows: 
Trading Partners and Trading Volumes.”   Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
123(2): 441–487.    
  56 
Heston, A, Summers, R. and Aten, B., 2009. “Penn World Table Version 6.3.” Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Hillman, Arye. 1982. “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives.” 
American Economic Review, 72(5): 1180–87. 
Hillman, Arye. 1989. The Political Economy of Protection.. New York: Harwood. 
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Keong Woo. 2003. “The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong 
Kong’s Labor Market.”  American Economic Review 95(5): 1673–1687. 
Hummels, David, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi.. 2001. “The Nature and Growth of Vertical 
Specialization in World Trade.” Journal of International Economics, 54(1): 75–
96. 
Hummels, David, and James Levinsohn. 1995. “Monopolistic Competition and 
International Trade: Reconsidering the Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics: 110(3): 799–836. 
Hummels, Davod, Dana Rapoport, and Kei-Mu Yi. 1998. “Vertical Specialization and the 
Changing Nature of World Trade.” Fed Reserve Bank New York Economic Policy 
Reiew,  4, 79–99.  
Kehoe, Patrick, and Kehoe, Timothy. 1995. “Capturing NAFTA’s Impact with Applied 
General Equilibrium Models.” In Modeling North American Integration: 
Advanced Studies in Theoretical and Applied Econometrics, ed. Patrick Kehoe 
and Timothy Kehoe, Vol. 31, 17-34. Boston: Kluwer.      
  57 
Kehoe, Timothy, and Kim Ruhl. 2003. “How Important is the New Goods Margin in 
International Trade?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Staff Report 324. 
Krugman, Paul, amd Anthony Venables. 1995. “Globalization and the Inequality of 
Nations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(4): 857–880. 
Levchenko, Andrei., 2007. “Institutional Quality and International Trade.” Review of 
   Economic Studies, 74(3): 791–819. 
Lileeva, Alla, and Daniel Trefler. 2007. “Improved Access to Foreign Markets Raises 
Plant-level Productivity ... for Some Plants.” NBER Working Paper number 
13297. 
Magee, Stephen, William Brock, and Leslie Young. 1989. Black Hole Tariffs and 
Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Markusen, James, Venables, A., 1995. “Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory.” 
NBER Working Paper 5036. 
Markusen, James, and Anthony Venables. 1996a. “The Theory of Endowment, Intra-
Industry, and Multinational Trade.” NBER Working Paper 5529. 
Markusen, James, and Anthony Venables. 1996b.”Multinational Production Skilled 
Labor and Real Wages.” NBER Working Paper 5483. 
Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. “Endogenous Tariff Formation.”  American Economic Review 
74(5): 970–985. 
Melitz, Marc. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
  Industry Productivity.” Econometrica 71(6), 1695–1725.     
  58 
Melitz, Marc, and Gianmarco Ottaviano. 2008. “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.” 
Review of Economic Studies, 75(1): 295–316. 
Nicita, Alessandro, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2006. “Trade, Production and Protection 
1976-2004.” World Bank Economic Review, 21(1). 
Nunn, Nathan. 2007. “Relationship-specificity, incomplete Contracts and the Pattern of 
   Trade.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2): 569–600. 
Ozden, Caglar, and Eric Reinhardt, E., 2005. “The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and 
Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976-2000.”  Journal  of Development 
Economics, 78(1): 1–21. 
Romalis, John. 2004. “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade.” 
American Economic Review, 94(1): 67–97. 
Romalis, John. 2007. “NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 89(3): 416–435. 
Ruhl, Kim. 2004. “The International Elasticity Puzzle.” NYU Stern School of Business, 
Working Paper. 
Ruhl, K., 2005. “The Elasticity Puzzle in International Economics.” Working Paper, 
University of Texas at Austin. 
Swenson, Deborah. 2004. “Overseas Assembly and Country Sourcing Choices.” NBER 
Working Paper 10697. 
Trefler, Daniel. 1993. “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: 
An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy.” Journal of Political Economy, 
101(1): 138–160.    
  59 
Whalley, John. 1985. Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Xu, Bin. 2000. “Multinational Enterprises, Technology Diffusion, and Host Country 
Productivity Growth.”  Journal of Development Economics, 62(2): 477–493. 
Xu, Bin, and Jianmao Wang, J., 1999. “Capital Goods Trade and R&D Spillovers in the 
OECD.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 32(5):1258–1274. 
Yamada, Tetsuo. 2005. “Relevance and Applicability of the UNIDO Industrial Statistics 
Database for Research Purposes.” United Nations Department of Statistics and 
Social Affairs Working Paper ESA/STAT/AC.105/21. 
Yi, Kei-Mu. 2003. “Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?” 
Journal of Political Economy, 111(1): 52–102. 
Yi, Kei-Mu. 2010. “Can Multi-stage Production Explain the Home Bias in Trade?” 
American Economic Review, 100(1): 364–393. 